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Gadamer’s Hermeneutic Contribution to a Theory of Time-Consciousness 
 





The nature of time-consciousness is one of the central themes of phenomenology, and one 
that all major phenomenologists have addressed at length, except Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
This paper attempts to develop Gadamer’s account of time-consciousness by looking, firstly, 
at two essays related to the topic, and then turning to his discussion of experience in Truth 
and Method (1960/1991) before, finally, considering his discussion of the unique temporality 
of the festival in the essay “The Relevance of the Beautiful” (1977/1986). What we find in 





Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics belongs to the 
phenomenological tradition. What is striking, thus, is 
that one of the central themes in phenomenology, the 
nature of time-consciousness, receives no sustained 
treatment in Gadamer’s writings. Edmund Husserl 
identified time-consciousness as the most 
fundamental level of consciousness, in that any 
consciousness is consciousness of a temporal object 
or event. Since an analysis of time-consciousness has 
also played a central role in the writings of Martin 
Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Paul Ricoeur, Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques 
Derrida, it is fair to say that Gadamer is the only 
major figure in phenomenology not to have addressed 
the issue of time at length.1 What could account for 
                                                 
1 For Heidegger’s discussion of time-consciousness see 
especially division II of Being and Time (1927/1996); for 
Sartre’s discussion of time-consciousness see especially 
part two, chapter two of Being and Nothingness 
(1943/1956); for Merleau-Ponty’s discussion see especially 
part three, chapter 2 of Phenomenology of Perception 
(1945/1962); for Ricoeur’s discussion see especially the 
third volume of Time and Narrative (1983-1985/1988); for 
Levinas’s discussion see especially chapter 2, section 3 of 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1974/1981); for 
this neglect? It is certainly not that he simply did not 
have the time to get around to writing on the topic; he 
died at the age of 102 and was writing until he was 
almost 100. More realistic possibilities are, firstly, 
that the themes of philosophical hermeneutics are 
such that an account of time is no longer necessary, 
and, secondly, that perhaps Gadamer does in fact 
present an account of time, but in a form that is 
different from others and so not readily recognized as 
such.  
 
The idea that Gadamer’s hermeneutics no longer 
needs an account of time-consciousness is plausible. 
Accounts of time-consciousness generally appear 
within the context of accounts of constitution. Since 
all objects appear as temporal objects, there must be 
an explanation for how the ego constitutes its 
awareness of time (and itself as in time). But 
Gadamer rejects egocentric accounts of constitution 
in favour of accounts, like Heidegger’s, that focus on 
the “lived experiences” of embodied beings in the 
world; perhaps, thus, the need for an account of time-
consciousness passes with the need for an egocentric 
                                                                          
Derrida’s discussion see especially Speech and Phenomena 
(1967/1973). 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 7, Edition 2 September 2007  Page 2 of 7 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This document is subject to 
copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the 
publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
account of constitution. It would seem not, however, 
as Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
neither employing an egocentric account of 
constitution, both explicitly address issues of time-
consciousness. In addition, even if constitution is 
fundamentally non-egoic and instead rooted in our 
embodied interactions with our environment, we still 
perceive and reflect on objects as spatio-temporal. 
How they gain their temporal character as objects of 
reflection, as objects of consciousness, therefore still 
needs explaining. Given that Paul Ricoeur, also a 
hermeneutic thinker, has made questions of time 
central in his writings, it is thus not enough simply to 
say that Gadamer’s hermeneutics displaces the issue. 
 
The alternative possibility, and the one I will defend 
here, is that Gadamer does have a theory of time-
consciousness; it simply is not readily recognizable as 
such, because he focuses on the character of 
encountering works as the paradigm for 
understanding hermeneutic experience. Although we 
must look at the few obscure places where Gadamer 
does discuss time  - “The Western View of the Inner 
Experience of Time and the Limits of Thought” 
(1977) and “Concerning Empty and Ful-filled Time” 
(1973) - it will be only in the context of his aesthetic 
theory - in the essay “The Relevance of the Beautiful” 
(1977/1986) and in his short section in Truth and 
Method (1960/1991) on the temporality of the 
aesthetic, for example - that we will find his full 
account of time-consciousness.2  
 
Gadamer’s starting point for his theory of time is 
Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl’s account of time-
consciousness. Questions of the constitution of time 
occupied Husserl for almost his entire career. 
Heidegger himself helped Husserl with the 
publication of his seminal Phenomenology of Internal 
Time-Consciousness (1919/1964), and both show 
time-consciousness as essential for experience. 
Heidegger argues that we experience the world first 
and foremost through our involvement in the world, 
not through our reflective consciousness of the world. 
                                                 
2 The essays on time have not been mentioned in any of the 
major secondary sources on Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics. Partly that is because these are seen as minor 
works published in obscure places, and partly that is 
because it is generally taken for granted that Gadamer 
simply adopts without question Heidegger’s revision of 
Husserl’s phenomenology. The one article that explicitly 
contrasts Gadamer and Heidegger and discusses the issue of 
time consciousness, Walter Lammi’s “Gadamer’s 
‘Correction’ of Heidegger” (1991), does not mention either 
of Gadamer’s essays on time. For a full account of 
Gadamer’s relation to Husserl independent from Heidegger 
see Lammi’s “Gadamer’s Debt to Husserl” (2001) and 
David Vessey’s “Who was Gadamer’s Husserl?” in the New 
Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological 
Philosophy (in press). 
Gadamer agrees that it is as living, embodied beings 
engaged in projects that we first become aware of 
time. Gadamer does not follow Heidegger, however, 
in seeing this as part of a larger project of trying to 
understand Being. Instead, Gadamer focuses his 
philosophical attention on the nature of hermeneutic 
experience - the experience of arriving at an 
interpretive understanding of some text, object or 
person. It is this experience that Gadamer ties to his 
account of time-consciousness. Thus, to the extent 
that Gadamer is making a significant contribution to 
phenomenology through his analysis of hermeneutic 
experience, so too does his corresponding account of 
time-consciousness make a positive contribution to a 
phenomenology of time-consciousness. 
 
Gadamer’s key distinction is between our sense of 
time as “empty” time and time as “fulfilled”. Empty 
time is time as something to manage and control - 
whether we fill it or waste it, it waits for its 
determination. In “The Relevance of the Beautiful” 
(1977/1986), Gadamer writes that,  
 
In the context of our normal, pragmatic 
experience of time, we say that we “have 
time for something”. The time is at our 
disposal; it is divisible; it is the time that 
we have or do not have, or at least think we 
do not have. In its temporal structure such 
time is empty and needs to be filled. (p. 41) 
 
It eventually becomes filled, and the past is this sense 
of time filled - there is no temporal room left in the 
past to fill. The sense of time as empty, awaiting and 
available, is the sense of time reflected in scientific 
accounts of time. It is by abstracting from this sense 
of time that we can arrive at a sense of measurable 
time as well as of space-time. 
 
In contrast to that of empty time, there is our sense of 
“autonomous” or “fulfilled” time - “a totally different 
experience of time I think is related to the kind of 
time characteristic of both the festival and the work of 
art” (Gadamer, 1977/1986, p. 42). Gadamer comes at 
this notion from a few directions, but he always ends 
up discussing the sense we have of the existence of an 
era or an epoch.3 Gadamer argues that, when we are 
aware of time directly, we are aware of belonging to 
temporal epochs, of existing within temporal periods 
either in our life or in history, and not simply of 
belonging to the continuous flow of time. Epochs are 
defined by their unity of character, but also by their 
distinctness from each other. 
                                                 
3 Era (or age, in the sense of “the age of…”) is my preferred 
translation, although epoch, cognate with the German die 
Epoche, is generally used. 
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There is such a thing as discontinuity in the 
course of events, with which we are 
acquainted in our experiences of epochs. 
… There is a sort of original experiencing 
of the time span of an epoch; the epochs 
which historians differentiate eventually 
prove to have their roots in genuine epoch-
experiences. (Gadamer, 1972, p. 233) 
 
The epoch is the primary way in which history is 
temporally organized, and it is how we experience 
ourselves as historical beings. When we find 
ourselves in a new age, we reconfigure ourselves with 
respect to the past and the future.4 
 
Temporal epochs are thus not only historical epochs, 
but personal epochs as well. Our lives are lived 
epochally - we live through stages and periods 
marked by often clear transitions such as the birth or 
death of a loved one. 
  
The ‘reality’ of time emerges much more 
clearly … in other phenomena. … For 
childhood, youth, maturity, old age and 
death mark out each individual’s path 
through life, and these milestones of the 
individual life are reflected in the 
institutions and customs of society. The 
experience which man acquires as he 
passes through these different stages is a 
genuine form of experience of time itself.  
It is not the same as the counting and use 
of time. … It is most closely connected 
with the historical sense, which is strictly 
speaking the awareness of epochs, of one’s 
own epoch and, in an even more basic way, 
of the ‘pastness’ of an epoch: a stopping 
place in the constant flow of time, the 
establishment of a ‘block of time’ 
consisting of the simultaneous or 
contemporaneous. (Gadamer, 1977, p. 43)  
                                                 
4 Consider this extended quotation from “Concerning 
Empty and Ful-filled Time”: “An epoch making event 
clearly ordains such a separation between old and new 
which we ourselves do not create and which we 
nevertheless must follow. When we become conscious that 
a new epoch is impinging upon us, or when we arrive at 
such a judgment in the retrospection of historical 
experience, that does not mean that the old is simply 
forgotten and the new welcomed, until the new again 
becomes obsolete and the old which was forgotten is 
renewed. When a new epoch dawns, one properly takes 
leave of the old. That is not forgetting, but rather cognition. 
For cognition always occurs in departure. In departing the 
old is so separated from the indefinite moments of 
expectation which had bound our existence to it as we were 
engaged and projected toward the future, that it now first 
begins to rest completely in itself” (Gadamer, 1973, p. 86). 
 
We recognize time through recognizing our lives as 
not only temporal, but temporal in a particular way: 
epochal. The transitions from epoch to epoch get their 
temporal importance not from being a juncture 
between what was and what will be, a purely formal 
idea and characteristic of “empty” time, but from the 
awareness of the dissolution of what was before in 
the advent of what is new. The consciousness of time 
arises with the consciousness of something that was 
the case having become no longer so. 
 
Here Gadamer is distancing himself from both 
Husserl and Heidegger. He holds that one of 
Husserl’s true breakthroughs was to conceive of the 
ego in terms of a life (in Husserl’s account of the life-
world), but that he, Husserl, failed to follow this 
insight through and to recognize it as undermining his 
goal of making phenomenology a rigorous science 
based on apodictic evidence. Heidegger recognized 
the limitations of Husserl’s project and left behind the 
idea of phenomenology as providing a final 
foundation for judgment; but, because he focused on 
the question of being, and Dasein as the being that 
can ask the question of being, his analysis of the 
temporality of Dasein remained formal. Gadamer 
takes seriously the idea that our lived experiences are 
the primary ones, but then argues that our lived 
consciousness of time is not simply as ecstatic 
thrown-projections, but as epochal.5 
 
Does this mean that time-consciousness is essentially 
disjointed? There is the pragmatic sense of time as 
measurable and empty, which is interrupted when 
transitional events occur, bringing to the fore the 
epochal sense of time. We might expect, given 
Heidegger’s influence on Gadamer and Gadamer’s 
argument that even the sciences rely on hermeneutical 
experience, that he would argue that time as empty 
was somehow derivative from time as fulfilled. His 
actual view, however, is more complicated, and we 
need to look at his account of hermeneutic experience 
in Truth and Method, interpreted in light of what he 
has written about time, to see the connections. But 
first a clarification of the word “experience” is 
required. The English word “experience” spans a 
variety of events that are sometimes differentiated in 
other languages. In German, there are two words, 
Erlebnis and Erfahrung, that both fall under the 
umbrella English word “experience”. Erlebnis is 
constructed from leben, to live, and refers to 
subjective, first-hand experiences. (In English we 
                                                 
5 Notice, too, that death does not play the same role for 
Gadamer as it does for Heidegger. For Gadamer it is a 
necessary marker of an epochal transition, whereas for 
Heidegger it is what makes possible authenticity. For 
Gadamer’s discussion of death see “The Experience of 
Death” in The Enigma of Health (1993/1996). 
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have a way of talking that parallels the German: 
consider the sentence “To understand something you 
need to live it.”) It is this subset of experiences that 
Husserl and Wilhelm Dilthey saw as a possible 
source for philosophical foundations. Erfahrung 
refers to that subset of experience that connects 
directly to judgment; it is often inferred, need not be 
first-person, and emphasizes cognitive insights. 
Erfahrung is constructed from fahren, to travel, 
inferring that the realizations in the experiences move 
and transform one. It correlates with the English word 
“empirical”, as in the empirical sciences 
(Erfahrungswissenschaft), and with the term “being 
experienced” (erfahrend).6 
  
The section of Truth and Method we are interested in 
is the section where Gadamer discusses Erfahrung  -  
a section he has called the central chapter of the book. 
In this chapter, he connects his account of 
hermeneutic experience with our “historically 
effected consciousness”, our awareness of ourselves 
as having historically conditioned awareness.7 He 
begins by claiming that “experience is related 
exclusively teleologically to the truth that is derived 
from it” (Gadamer, 1960/1991, p. 347), by which he 
means that experience bears with it the expectation of 
confirmation in the future. It is this futural, 
verificationist aspect that makes possible empirical 
science. 
 
The fact that experience is valid so long as 
it is not contradicted by new experience 
(ubi non reperitur instantia contradictoria) 
is clearly a characteristic of the general 
                                                 
6 For other places where Gadamer discusses his 
understanding of experience, see “Wissen zwischen gestern 
und morgen” in Hermeneutische Entwürfe (2000), 
“Hermeneutics and Historicism” published as Supplement I 
to Truth and Method (1960/1991), “Man and Language” 
(1966) in Philosophical Hermeneutics (1976) and Gadamer 
in conversation (1993/2001, pp. 52-53). Two helpful 
secondary sources are Tom Nenon’s “Hermeneutical Truth 
and the Structure of Human Experience: Gadamer’s 
Critique of Dilthey” (1992/1995) and chapter three of 
James Risser’s Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other 
(1997). 
 
7 “Wirkungsgeschichtliches bewusstsein” is a notoriously 
difficult phrase to translate into English, much less decipher 
in German. Gadamer is only sometimes helpful, and his 
clearest explanation is the following: “On the one hand I 
want to say that our consciousness is really historically 
[wirkungsgeschlichtlich] determined, that is … determined 
by real events rather than left on its own to float free over 
against the past. And on the other hand I want to say that it 
is important to produce within ourselves a consciousness of 
this operativeness [ein Bewusstsein dieses Bewirktseins] -  
just as the past which we experience forces us to deal with 
it and so to manage it, and in a certain respect take its truth 
upon ourselves” (Gadamer, 1972, p. 238). 
nature of experience, whether we are 
dealing with scientific procedure in the 
modern sense or with the experience of 
daily life that men have always had. 
(Gadamer, 1960/1991, p. 350)  
 
Clearly the teleological aspect of experience 
corresponds to the experience of time as empty/ 
fulfilled. But, just as Gadamer thinks that we are 
aware of time in other ways, so too is there more to 
experience than its teleological character.  
 
To see what these other aspects of experience are, 
Gadamer turns to Francis Bacon’s account in Novum 
Organum (1620) of the idols of the mind, and 
specifically the idols of the cave, the tribe, the 
marketplace.8 Bacon was concerned about distorting 
influences on our judgment created by our individual 
intellectual tendencies (say for novelty), species-wide 
intellectual tendencies (such as focusing on the 
positive), and tendencies found in language (as when 
we allow words to lead us to experience things 
inaccurately). In order for science to be properly 
experimental, Bacon argues that we need to purge 
ourselves of these idols. Gadamer, appropriately, sees 
this list as features of experience that are irreducible 
to the teleological aspects of experience. The sense of 
ourselves, our nature as human beings, and our 
language, are all present in experience (Erfahrung); it 
is because of these that we recognize our experiences 
as reflecting who we are here and now at this point in 
our lives. These elements of experience that are 
marginalized by science - for precisely what it means 
for an experience to be objective is that it doesn’t 
bear the trace of being essentially shaped by the place 
and time of the experiencer - are central to 
hermeneutic experience. When we find a way to 
understand a text, another person, or work of art, we 
draw upon these features of ourselves. We recognize 
that our ability to understand comes from who we are 
here and now; and so, although those features of 
experience are marginalized for the sake of scientific 
inquiry, they are brought to the fore for the sake of 
hermeneutical experience - where, most importantly, 
the features of experience have the temporal structure 
of epochs. 
 
Rather than attempting to derive our sense of time as 
empty from our epochal sense of time, Gadamer 
argues that both belong to experience; experience, in 
the sense of Erfahrung, both includes the formal 
expectations that characterize the empty sense of time 
reflected in the sciences, and relates us to the 
particular epoch of our lives and times. Both elements 
of time-consciousness are contained in experience.  
                                                 
8 Gadamer does not discuss the idols of the theatre, the 
distortions on the basis of accepting authority, perhaps 
because he emphasizes the legitimacy of authority.  
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Gadamer ends “Concerning Empty and Ful-filled 
Time” with a discussion of poetry, for it is in 
reflecting on our engagement with works of art that 
Gadamer thinks we can see most clearly the structure 
of our consciousness of time. Consider his discussion 
of play and festivals in the essay “The Relevance of 
the Beautiful: Art as Play, Symbol and Festival”. Play 
is Gadamer’s preferred word to describe the exchange 
between a work of art and an interpreter such that a 
meaning can become present. Insofar as it is 
meaningful in some way for the interpreter, the 
meaning is tied to the present, but in that it links the 
interpreter to the work, it creates what Gadamer calls 
a “contemporeity” between the interpreter and the 
work. Such aesthetic experiences always have a 
temporal character. Festivals are similar, although 
they are communally acted interruptions in the flow 
of time.  
 
There is in addition, however, a totally 
different experience of time which I think is 
profoundly related to the kind of time 
characteristic of both the festival and the 
work of art. We all know the festival fulfils 
every moment of its duration. Its fulfilment 
does not come about because someone has 
empty time to fill up. On the contrary, the 
time only becomes festive with the arrival of 
the festival … . It is the nature of the 
festival that it should proffer time, arresting 
it and allowing it to tarry. … The calculating 
way in which we normally manage and 
dispose of our time is, as it were, brought to 
a standstill. (Gadamer, 1977/1986, p. 42) 
 
We recognize in the ritualised repetition of festivals a 
re-presentation of a past event and a temporal 
identification between the present and the past event 
such that they stand out together against the sense 
otherwise of passing, “empty” time. The play of a 
work of art and a festival provide examples of ways 
in which aesthetic experience is fundamentally a 
source of our consciousness of time.9 
 
Drawing on the themes of Gadamer’s aesthetic 
theory, we can thus delineate the basic themes of 
Gadamer’s theory of time-consciousness: a theory 
that locates Gadamer squarely within the 
phenomenological tradition on this classic issue. 
Time-consciousness is fundamentally connected to 
                                                 
9 Sheila Ross has most fully developed the temporal aspect 
of the experience of a work of art that Gadamer calls 
tarrying (Verweilen). See her “Gadamer’s Late Thinking on 
Verweilen” (2004), “Temporality of Tarrying in Gadamer” 
(2006), and her doctoral dissertation Event Hermeneutics 
and Narrative: Tarrying in the Philosophy of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer (2003). 
experience; it manifests itself both as an expression of 
our human epochal way of life, where past meanings 
are always being realized anew through ritual and 
festival, and as a sense of openness in the future, 
capable of being filled through our actions. The 
epochal nature of time-consciousness is realized most 
concretely in the various stages or eras of our lives, 
and helps to establish the temporal distance and 
varied horizons that make understanding possible. 
Finally, the transitional nature of time-consciousness 
reinforces the transitional nature of hermeneutic 
experience, which must always consciously put aside 
old ways of understanding in order to bring about 
new insights. It is the interweaving of the account of 
the sense of time with the themes from his account of 
hermeneutic experience that shows the importance of 
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